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Abstract
Several Authors pointed-out positive effects of CAP measures on productive factors demand, 
driving both structural change and farm growth. Moreover, the effects of CAP on farm size and 
land markets are the most studied structural factors. The objective of this contribution is to 
conduct exante analysis of the impact of the new CAP policy instruments on the land demand 
and then to simulate the reform impact on land market. In particular in the paper the effect of 
greening payments and the introduction of regionalized payments will be investigated, through 
the implementation of mathematical programming model. The results of our work highlight the 
relevance of new CAP instrument in changing land demand. Our results can to contribute to the 
national debate by providing a better to understanding the potential effects of the CAP reform 
on the value of land and on the changes in land demand.
JEL: Q18 – Agricultural Policy; Food Policy; Q10 General 
Keywords: common agricultural policy; mathematical programming model; land demand; re-
gionalised payments; scenario analysis
1. Introduction 
Agricultural economics literature widely studied how Common Agricultural Policy leads to 
changes in the use of productive factors at farm level. Most Authors pointed-out the positive ef-
fects of the CAP measures. Such measures had driven both structural change and farm growth 
(see for example Harrington et al., 1995; Happe et al., 2008; Ahearn et al., 2005). Thus, the 
effects of the CAP on farm size and land markets are the most studied among structural factors 
(Ciaian et al. 2010; Bartolini and Viaggi 2013). Agricultural economics literature is interested 
in land use changes and in land market, as land is among the key variables in farm household 
models, as well as a relevant constraint on those models. In addition, land can represent the 
overall output of farm household decisions (see Piorr et al., 2009). 
At present, the CAP is facing a deep reform process. In October 2011, the European Commission 
published the official proposal for the CAP reform (COM(2011)625/3), which had been debated 
until June 2013, when the European Parliament and the Commission came to an agreement. The 
member states will not officially approve the CAP before August 2014. The proposed CAP reform 
reconsiders the first pillar policy, while introducing novelties within the second pillar policy. In 
Italy, the main innovations concern a) the introduction of “active farmers”, b) the shift of single 
farm payments from an historical towards a regional base, and c) the disentanglement of the 
basic payment into several components. As a result of the introduction of the “active farmers”, 
only those farmers who fulfil the requirements set by the Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 (Arti-
cles 9(1) and (2)) will access the payments (COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) No 
639/2014 of 11 March 2014). Shifting single farm payments from a historical towards a regional 
base means that basic payments will be proportional to the operated farmland. With the disen-
tanglement of the basic payment, four different components would form the payment for each 
farm: (i) the basic payment for “active farmers”, (ii) the “greening” direct payment, (iii) the pay-
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ment for less disadvantaged areas, and (iv) the payment to “young farmers” and “small farms”.
The objective of this contribution is to conduct ex-ante analysis of the impact of the new CAP 
policy instruments on land demand, as well as to simulate the impact of the reform on land 
market. The present paper investigates the effect of the greening payments and the introduction 
of the regionalized payments by means of mathematical programming modelling. 
The results of our work highlight the relevance of new CAP instrument in changing land demand. 
2. Methodology 
Agricultural economics studies land use and its connections with policy under three different 
perspectives: a) changes in the preferences with regard to land tenure, b) the capitalization of 
payments into land prices or farmland rental prices, and c) effects of the policies on land demand, 
for, land markets, and land reallocations (Viaggi et al., 2013). The impacts of the policy on land 
market had been investigated through a number of different approaches, mainly econometric 
methods, statistical methods, and mathematical programming modelling (Latruffe and Le Mouël, 
2009). Econometric and statistical methods are often used to investigate the determinants of cer-
tain expected changes over potential changes in land demand (See for example Douarin et al. 
2008), as well as to assess the probability for farms to turn into definite possible states over time 
(e.g by applying the Markov chain model) (see for example Zimmermann et al. 2009). Math-
ematical programming is used to simulate both ex-ante impacts on land demand and changes on 
land prices (i.e. purchase and rent agreements). Mathematical programming also allows to test 
different hypothesis about relevant parameters such as changes in the level of prices, amount of 
payments, cost of labour, and other inputs (see for example Happe et al 2008; Galko and Jayet 
2011). Following Bartolini and Viaggi (2013), the marginal changes in land demand result from 
the Willingness to Pay (WTP) or the Willingness to Accept (WTA) for land, given a fixed policy 
scenario and an initial land endowment. Where, the WTP and WTA are functions of the geo-
graphical household, the farmers and farm’s characteristics. Following Deininger et al. (2008), 
a generic farmer can claim for additional land when the WTP for the land exceeds the sum of 
rental prices and transaction costs (see Eq. 1 for the formal expression). Conversely, the farmer 
shrinks the surface of operated land when the WTA is under the rental prices (received) minus the 
transaction costs (TC) for rent out land (see Eq2 for the formula). Finally, there is no change in land 
demand at single farmers’ level when the sum of rental prices plus TCs exceeds the WTP, and, at 
the same time, the WTA exceeds the rental prices received minus the related TCs. 
Agricultural economics literature widely studied the impacts of TCs on land demand and on 
land market. The total transaction costs depend on frequency and asset of transactions, farmers’ 
characteristics, quality of social relationships, and trust among peoples, as well as on institu-
tional factors (see Williamson 1996, Allen and Lueck 2003 and Ciaian et al., 2012), When con-
sidered together, the transaction cost and the changes in land demand provide the sum of total 
time spent for collecting information about the availability of rentable land rent plus the cost of 
contract registrations. Moreover, farmers renting out land are subject to TCs, due to time spent 
for searching farmers interested in the transaction. The increase TCs leads to a reduction of the 
number of transactions number and positively affects rental prices. 
	  
intcrWTP +>    (1)
	  
outtcrWTA −<    (2)
	  
tcrWTAWTPtcr out +>>− /  (3)
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The proposed methodology contains three steps: a) identification of representative farm house-
holds, b) development of policy scenarios, and c) mathematical programming modelling. 
The present study refers to farms located within a local administration (Province of Pisa) of the 
Italian Region of Tuscany. Representative farms were identified performing a cluster analysis. 
The implementation of simulations using built rather than real farms is common in agricultural 
economics literatures (see for example Bartolini and Viaggi 2012). The main advantage of cluster 
analysis is its ability to create groups of farms which are both homogeneous and very different 
from one another. In addition, median values of group characteristics allow to create farm pro-
files that are representative for each group of farms (see example in Galko and Jayet 2010). The 
cluster analysis returned 14 groups of homogeneous farms: 6 located in plain areas and 8 groups 
hilly areas1. Policy impacts were quantified via scenario analysis. We simulated the impacts of 
the CAP post-2013 on changes in land demand by developing two alternative policy scenarios, 
based on different assumptions with regard to the amount of the regionalised payment and to the 
introduction of the greening measure. An additional scenario encompassing the complete abol-
ishment of the CAP was built to capture the full effect of the Single Farm Payment (SFP). Table 1 
shows the main assumption we made in order to built the alternative scenarios.
Table 1 Features of scenarios.
Scenario code 
Level of SFP 
per rights 
Rights Greening 
Baseline HC 2008 ba Historical Current Entitlements No 
Baseline1 ba1 Historical Current Entitlements 30% of basic payment 
Regionalized 0 rp0 206.35 Current entitlement 30% of basic payment 
Regionalized 1 rp1 135.94 Payment per ha of UAA 30% of basic payment 
The baseline scenario (ba) is developed assuming 2013 payments SFP on a historical basis and 
number of rights equal to those endowed by the farms in 2013. The scenario is build under 
Health Check 2008 reform. Baseline HC 2008 scenario (ba1) differentiates from ba for intro-
duction of greening measure. The level of SFP and entitlement mechanism remains constant. 
We simulated two regionalised payment mechanisms (rp): (i) rp0 is is based on the application 
of a uniform payment per entitlement (flat rate), and (ii) rp1 is based on a uniform payment per 
hectare of UAA. Thus, the level of SFP will be higher for rp0 (about 206.35 € per right) than for 
rp1 (135.94 € per ha)2. 
The third step of the methodology relies on the simulation of farmers’ behaviour in response to 
1. Cluster analysis is conducted using a subset of farmers surveyed in the 2010 census in Pisa province 
(4868 farms). A sub-set is realized excluding farm with very low farm size. The groups are indentified 
using k-means non-hierarchical clustering method and the groups are identified by the one with higher 
Calinski/Harabasz pseudo-F value. Cluster group are conducted using farm size, amount of SFP payments 
received and amount of household labor allocated to on-farm activities as variables. To detect collinearity 
among selected variables, a pairwise correlation test is applied. The test returns low coefficients of corre-
lation among variables: 0.4243 for pair farm size and amount of SFP payments; 0.2843 for pair farm size 
and household labor allocated to on-farm activities and 0.1135 for household labor allocated to on-farm 
activities and amount of SFP received. Otherwise, farm specialization variables are not considered due to 
expected correlation with payments received and farmland size.
2. The SFP is calculated as sum of all SFP received by Tuscany famers divided by the amount of eligible 
area. Thus for the np0 scenario eligible area is equal to the sum of all entitlements owned by Tuscany 
Farmers, while for all UAA in a case of rp1 scenario. 
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policy changes. We modelled land demand using Mathematical Programming modelling. Gen-
erally, farmers aim at maximising the Net Present Value (NPV) of profit of their farm activity; the 
maximization on the NPV is subjected to a set of constraints. Formally:
Where the profit for a generic year n is given by the sum of the farm income minus the variable 
and fixed costs of growing crops, i, minus the cost of renting-in land and the cost of labour paid, 
plus the received SFP and the costs of rented-out land (when applicable). Equation 6 is the land 
demand equation. Due to the short time period, we assumed that only rental market is activated, 
thus farmers could either increase the surface of the operated land by renting land or reduce 
the surface of the operated land renting-out a portion of their own land. The set of equations 7 
show the technical constraints we activated: (j) a maximum number of entitlements endowed by 
the farmer (See Bartolini and Viaggi, 2013 and Severini and Valle 2011) and (ii) non negativity 
constraints of land and crops variables. The model refers to short-medium period, with a time 
horizon between year 2014 and 2020. The short-medium period allows only for adjustment in 
variable factors, while the fixed factors are considered as constants. Literature about the CAP’s 
effects on land market largely focuses only on rental prices. Actually, rental price changes and 
land value either have a close relationship(see Bartolini and Viaggi 2013) or are more dependent 
on other factors rather than profitability of agricultural activities with respect to the demand for 
land (i.g. position; life cycle hypothesis, credit markets etc. see Swinnen and Knops 2013 for a 
review). Moreover, the selected time span (short–medium term) is not able to provide a coher-
ent behaviour of famers’ investments; hence, neither the purchase nor the rental of land can be 
robustly investigated (See Puddu et al., 2012 for an analysis of policy impact on land demand 
considering both rental and buying market).
Data used for the simulation were obtained by merging CENSUS 2010 microdata with the 
ARTEA (regional payment agency of Tuscany) database. The latter has recorded all payments 
received by farmers since 2005, which we integrated with information about the dynamics of 
land market and prices, directly collected through interviews with experts.
3. Results 
Results are presented in the two following tables. Firstly, model results under baseline scenario 
(historical system without greening measure) are presented. Scenarios’ effects on marginal rental 
value are presented under the alternative assumption of transaction costs.
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Table 2. Model results under baseline scenario.
Cluster Alt.
NPV 
(1000 €)
SFP (1000 
€ per year)
Entit.(#)
Payment 
(€/entit)
UAA   
(ha)
Land  
owned (ha)
Land  
rented-in 
(ha)
Land 
rented-out 
(ha)
CL1 plain 170.09 5.39 22 239.80 35.1 16.94 18.16 -
CL2 plain 1,028.52 49.13 119 412.87 183.43 96.78 86.65 -
CL3 plain 940.69 75.46 105 718.69 122.04 237.52 - 115.48
CL4 plain 971.03 30.90 109 284.66 180.14 81.72 98.42 -
CL5 plain 68.26 - - - 12.69 9.04 3.65 -
CL6 plain 454.76 16.71 65 258.79 99.01 33.71 65.3 -
CL7 hill 1,060.43 32.81 264 124.30 265.8 184.05 81.75 -
CL8 hill 176.55 4.75 23 206.86 34.2 20.21 13.99 -
CL9 hill 638.45 22.11 94 234.03 141.21 60.08 81.13 -
CL10 hill 454.52 14.47 62 232.13 91.65 50.88 40.77 -
CL11 hill 790.34 23.72 159 149.20 161.97 90.38 71.59 -
CL12 hill 95.90 - - - 16.14 9.3 6.84 -
CL13 hill 99.81 2.00 11 183.46 17.34 11.17 6.17 -
CL14 hill 295.51 9.15 29 315.48 60.27 27.99 32.28 -
According to our analysis, most clusters present a similar behavior with respect to land 
demand under baseline condition. Almost all clusters use rented-in land to increase the 
surface of the land operated, while only cluster CL3 rents-out a portion of land. This cluster 
rents-out more than 50% owned land. The amount of SFP received by the farms are highly 
heterogeneous. All clusters get the SFP, but CL5 and CL12.SFP received by farms is under 
10,000 € for CL1, CL8, CL13, and CL 14 and above for all other clusters. The amount of 
SFP is higher than the expected, because of the exclusion of all farms operating less than 1 
hectare. Those farms were excluded due to negligible impact of SFP changes on small farms.
(Viaggi et al., 2013). SFP provided to single farms is heterogeneous because of their amount 
of collected rights and their level of unitary payment. Three clusters (CL2, CL3, and CL14) 
show very high unitary payments, i.e. about two or three times bigger than all other clusters. 
The value of the unitary payment is above the average for CL9 and CL 10 and under for CL7 
and CL11 However, the endowments which CL7 and CL 11 are entitled for are nearly twice 
other clusters’ endowments. 
Table 3 contains the changes in the surface of the operated land and in the marginal value of 
land, compared with baseline results.
86
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 51st SIDEA CONFERENCE
Table 3. Policy impact on land demand (% of change in UAA and in WTP3).
Cluster 
ba1 rp0 rp1
UAA WTP UAA WTP UAA WTP
1 - - - - - -
2 - - -0.07 - - 4 .02 -
3 - - - 77.31 - - 78.64 -
4 - - - - - -
5 - - - - 1.13 -
6 - - - - - -
7 2.43 - - - - -
8 - - - - - -
9 - - 0.11 - - 12.20 - - 20.00
10 - - - - 19.51 - - 19.66
11 2.03 - 2.03 - - -
12 - - - - - -
13 - - - - 2.41 -
14 - - - - 19.30 - -14.20
Changes in the marginal value measure the increase of the objective value of having an addi-
tional hectare of land. Agricultural economists refer to the marginal value and to the changes 
in farmers’ WTP as benchmarks to quantify changes in rental prices (Galko and Jayet, 2010). In 
fact, the model returns changes in the objective function (NPV) by adding one additional unit of 
land; then, the marginal value can capture changes in the willingness to pay for an additional 
land or in the willingness to accept for additional land.
According to our model, few farmers are affected by changes in land demand, due to the inclu-
sion of the greening measure.. Only three farmers show reactions to the introduction of greening 
(ba1). Two clusters CL7 and CL11 show a relatively low increase(about 2%) in the surface of op-
erated land, due to the needs to enlarge farm size to fulfill the greening requirements. It was not 
surprising noting that the clusters have entitlement endowment above the average of clusters, 
as well as the highest share of eligible hectares per UAA. Hence, farm types willing to maintain 
the whole SFP find profitable to rent-in more land to maintain the constraint of the maximum 
75% land cultivated with the main crop. Conversely, CL9 only shows a reduction of WTP for 
additional land, due to the introduction of new crops within the crop mix, as it required by the 
diversification commitments. 
The model shows that on third of clusters (CL2; CL3; CL5; CL9; CL 10; CL11; CL14; CL15:) 
seems be affected by a reduction in land demand following the introduction of the regionalized 
payments. expectation It was surprising noting that those clusters are the ones getting the highest 
payments per entitlements, rather than the ones with the highest support from SFP.. Those results 
seem to confirm previous literature findings on the impact of regionalized payments (Puddu et 
al., 2014). The introduction of both the uniformed payments per entitlements and the greening 
(rp0) resulted in a reduction in operated land in two farms and in an increase in cluster CL11 
only, as it was observed for previous scenarios. The clusters with the higher unitary value of SFP 
are those which reduced the operated. The introduction of uniform payment per entitlements re-
duces by one third the unitary value of payments (CL2 and CL3). Cluster 2 shows a relative small 
3. Willingness to pay refers is quite huge concepts and includes market value, not market value and op-
tion value. In this paper WTP can be approximated to shadow prices for increase of one unit the amount 
of operated land, due the private agents and the limitation at the rental market.
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change in the operated land, while cluster 3 showed a rough 70% reduction, mainly due to a 
higher share of rented-out land. For other clusters, the model highlighted a reduction in WTP for 
an additional amount of land, while maintaining the same operated land (CL 9, CL10 and CL 
19.30). The introduction of regionalized payments per hectares of UAA (rp1) produced patterns 
of changes very similar to previous scenarios, but for the higher magnitude. The introduction of 
uniform payment per hectare of UAA determined an increase in the operated land for the two 
clusters that do not receive payments under baseline. Contrary to all expectation, the increase 
is relatively small, thus highlighting other limiting factors to farm expansion. Overall, our results 
confirm previous literature findings about the positive effects of SFP in maintaining operated 
farm land (Bartolini and Viaggi 2013 and Puddu et al., 2014). 
4. Conclusions
In this paper we simulated the policy impacts on the land demand. Changes in the land oper-
ated and in the marginal value of land were used as proxies for WTP or WTA. Several authors 
simulated ex-ante impact of new CAP policy instruments. The aim of this paper is to provide 
empirical evidence about the impact of the new CAP instruments. Our results highlight that re-
gionalized payments would affect the change land demand more than other tested policy instru-
ments. Our results point out the prominent role of the new SFP payments in affecting changes 
in land demand and confirm previous literature findings (Puddu et al., 2014). In particular, our 
results highlight the heterogeneity of the impacts of the new policy mechanism. A shared out-
come of the new CAP, for some clusters, is the quite high reduction of the overall land demand. 
Such reduction might determine detrimental effects on rental value that can be attenuated by 
the implementation of the coupled payments for specific sectors (which were not included in 
the model for the uncertainty in the extent of the payments due to earlier stage of the reform 
process). In particular, it seems that livestock, cereal and olive famers will benefit quite relevant 
coupled payments. As a result, those sectors are expected to be less affected by changes in land 
demand or in rental market. 
Altogether, the results of our study confirm an overall reduction of land demand and land market 
activity, due to the introduction of rationalised payments, and show different impacts on differ-
ent representative farms. The main drivers of the impact are the endowment of entitlement, the 
unitary payments level, and the share of eligible land over the total UAA. According to our re-
sults, the shift to the flat rate for SFP (the so-called “Irish model” that has been selected for Italy) 
should have a smaller impact on the change in land demand, as the convergence mechanism 
will allow for gradual adjustments. The Irish model scenario is a quite comparable with rp0 
scenario. 
The paper is affected by several limitations, due to the attempt to simulate policy changes with-
out having clear norms to refer about both the amount of regionalisation payments and the level 
of coupled payments (i.e. Art. 68). Moreover, the proposed model does not deal with uncertainty 
and risk in farming activities which literature point out as being able to affect changes in farmers’ 
behaviour. Finally, the paper does not simulate land market, but use the marginal value to as a 
proxy for land demand changes. 
Further work would include further components of risk and investment in farmers’ behaviour, as 
well as the simulation of the interactions among different clusters.
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